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Abstract 
This paper proposes a simple variation of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) construct 
and integrates it to a dynamic general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous 
agents.  We study an overlapping generations framework in which agents must 
initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to evade, they 
then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-report.  We find 
that in comparison with the basic approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice drastically 
reduces the extent of evasion in the economy.  This outcome is the result of an 
anomaly intrinsic to the basic Allingham and Sandmo version of the model, which 
makes the evade-or-not extension a more suitable approach to modeling the issue. We 
also find that the basic model, and the model with and ‘evade or not’ choice have 
strikingly different political economy implications, which suggest fruitful avenues of 
empirical research.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The standard approach to tax compliance applies the economics-of-crime 
methodology pioneered by Becker (1968): in its first application, due to Allingham 
and Sandmo (1972) it models the behavior of agents as a decision involving choice of 
the extent of their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional 
environment, represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and 
penalties in the event the agent is caught.  While this basic framework yields 
important insights on tax compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations.  
Specifically, it indicates a level of compliance that is significantly below what is 
observed in the data.  This paper proposes a simple variation of the Allingham and 
Sandmo construct and integrates it to a dynamic general equilibrium framework with 
heterogeneous agents.  We study an overlapping generations framework in which 
agents must initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. In the event they decide to 
evade, they then have to decide the extent of income or wealth they wish to under-
report.  We find that in comparison with the basic approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice 
drastically reduces the extent of evasion in the economy.  We also find that the basic 
model, and the model with and ‘evade or not’ choice have strikingly different political 
economy implications. 
      Several strands of research have motivational relevance for our work.  There is a 
growing body of work that seeks to study tax evasion and its implications in the 
context of macroeconomic models.  See, for example, Gupta and Ziramba(2008), 
Caballe and Panades (2004), and Chen (2003), among others.  However, to our 
knowledge, all of these studies apply the classical approach to tax evasion – given a 
certain probability of detection, agents chose how much to evade.  In some cases the 
models are of a representative-agent type, while in others some form of heterogeneity 
is assumed. We believe that particularly in the latter case the classical construct may 
not be appropriate.  Given that poorer agents in the economy are likely to find the tax 
evasion decision relatively expensive in the event they are caught, it seems sensible to 
give all agents a choice that involves the comparison of expected utilities – viz. 
choose to evade if and only if the expected utility from evading is higher than the 
expected utility from not evading. 
      There is, of course a large body of literature in the micro-theoretic public finance 
field that extends the basic Allingham and Sandmo construct along several 
dimensions, particularly with a view to address its under-prediction of the extent of 
compliance relative to the data. (See for example Alm and Martinez-Vasquez 2003, 
and references therein).  While we believe that these contributions are important in 
that they take into account the implications of more realistic behavioral assumptions 
and the importance of social norms, there is a need to revisit the basic framework to 
see if rational choice per se can yield a more realistic prediction in relation to 
compliance. 
      We also find that incorporating the ‘evade or not’ decision into the basic model 
leads to strikingly different political economy implications for the degree of 
progressivity of the tax-system in the economy.  Basically, in a model of 
heterogeneous agents voting on parameters of progressivity, the Allingham and 
Sandmo construct implies a high degree of progressivity in the political equilibrium, 
while the model with the ‘evade or not’ choice implies a relatively low degree of 
progressivity. 
      These results appear reasonably intuitive.  In the ‘evade or not’ model, the 
efficiency of the tax-collection system does not matter; a large number of agents in 
the economy do not evade.  Agents therefore vote on a mildly progressive tax 
structure.  In the basic model agents vote for a progressive tax structure, even though 
progression appears to increase the extent of evasion; despite the increased extent of 
evasion redistributive transfers are greater in the latter case. 
      The remaining sections of the paper are organized as follows.  In Section 2, we 
first describe a ‘benchmark model’, which integrates the approach followed in the tax-
compliance literature pioneered by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) to a 
heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model.  In the part B of Section 2 
we present an extension of the basic model which allows agents to initially decide 
whether they wish to evade taxes or not.  In part C of section 2 we consider political 
economy extensions of the models presented in parts A and B.   In Section 3, we 
analyze the results of some quantitative experiments based on the models described in 
Section 2.    Concluding remarks are presented in Section 4. 
 
2. The Economic Environment 
A.  The Benchmark Economy 
We consider a small open economy of 2-period lived overlapping generations of 
agents.  Time is discrete, with ∞= ,...2,1,0t , and there is no population growth.  
Agents are heterogeneous with respect to inheritance received from the previous 
generation. The distribution of this inherited wealth for the generation born in period t 
is given by )(WFt , which represents the fraction of the population with wealth less 
than or equal to W.  In the first period of their lives, individuals inelastically supply 
labor in return for the income endowment of y , which is the same for all agents.  An 
agent therefore has a composite income and wealth endowment tWy + , and is 
expected to pay taxes according to the function )( tWt , which satisfies the feasibility 
conditions: (1) WWt ≤)( , i.e., taxes paid cannot exceed the wealth endowment, and 
(2) 1)( ≤′ Wt , i.e., disposable income is non-decreasing in the initial pre-tax 
endowment.  However, the individual does not necessarily report all of his or her 
wealth, and therefore pays taxes on the amount W)1( α− , where α is the proportion 
of unreported income.  This decision involves a cost described by )(αd , which is 
increasing in α .  The decision regarding the proportion α  is taken prior to the audit 
by the tax-authorities, as is the decision regarding the consumption-saving plan of the 
agent, which will be described shortly.  The probability of detection of this evasion 
and the subsequent punishment after the audit is given by p , where ]1,0[∈p .  The 
punishment involves payment of any unpaid taxes, and a proportion of the income 
that is left over after all taxes have been paid.1  The tax-authority maintains a balanced 
budget, so that average revenue collection is equal the lump-sum transfer given to all 
individuals born in t.  Individuals do not pay taxes, or receive transfers in the second 
period of their lives.  The expected equilibrium lump-sum transfer is given by: 
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      In the above equation dyc represents ‘disposable income when caught’, and 
t
d WW )1( α−= , the proportion of wealth that is reported to the tax authority. The 
preferences of an individual born in t are given by: 
   { } { } )1(.)()()()1()()()( 1111 nctnctnctctctct bvcucupbvcucup ++++ ++−+++ θθ    
                                                 
1  Conventionally the modelling strategy would involve an imposition of a penalty in proportion of the 
amount of unpaid taxes.  But it is possible that this reduces the agent’s disposable income in the state 
when caught to a negative amount.  In that case one would have to impose inequality constraints on the 
optimisation problem, which would complicate matters without impacting on the results in a qualitative 
sense. 
Here, we assume that u and v are concave and twice continuously differentiable. The 
superscripts c and nc represent the states “caught” and “not-caught”, and individual 
chooses their state-contingent consumption, saving and bequest plan 
nc
t
c
t
nc
t
c
t
nc
t
c
t
nc
t
c
t bbccsscc 1111 ,,,,,,, ++++ , and the proportion of W that is unreported, α , to 
maximize (1) subject to the following budget constraints: 
                   )2(],)()()[1( cttt
c
t sdWtWyc −−−++−= ατφ  
                  )3(,)1( 11
c
t
c
tt
c
t bsrc ++ −+=  
                  )4(,)()( nct
d
t
nc
t sdWtWc −−−+= ατ  
                     )5(.)1( 11
nc
t
nc
tt
nc
t bsrc ++ −+=  
   In the above equations, tr is the exogenously determined world interest rate faced by 
this small open economy.  Substituting the constraints (2)-(5) in (1), and maximizing 
over the choice of α,,,, 11 nctctnctct bbss ++ , yields the following first-order conditions for an 
optimum: 
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Equations (6)-(9) are the Euler equations that are fairly standard in models of this type 
and have the usual interpretations.  Equation (10) equates the marginal expected loss 
from evasion when caught, to the marginal benefit from evasion.  This interpretation 
is perhaps easier to see if one recognizes that (6),(7), (8), and (9) imply 
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Let this ratio be represented by δ , which is a function of W and parameters of the 
model, but for given parameters and W can be regarded as a constant.  Then, (10) can 
be simplified to: 
                          )()]1()1([)()1( αφδ dppWWtp td ′−+−=′− . 
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Substituting for ctc  and 
nc
tc  in (10), we then have an implicit equation in α  and tW .  
In the following section, we will assume that γWbWt =)( , and that 20)( αα dd = , 
)1,0(∈b . The cost-of-evasion function and associated parameters are interpreted as in 
Chen (2003).  In the tax function, the parameter γ  represents the degree of 
progression in taxes: 1>γ  implies a non-linear progressive tax scheme in which 
marginal tax rates are increasing in income and wealth, and 1<γ  represents a 
‘counter-factual’ regressive tax scheme with decreasing marginal tax rates.  In the 
1=γ case, the marginal tax rate is constant, represented by the parameter b.  Making 
these further substitutions in equation (10), can be numerically solved for *α .  Once 
*α  is known equations (11)-(18) can be used to derive optimal values of other 
variables. Furthermore since (15) and (16), representing bequests in the cases evasion 
is detected and not detected, represent the next generation’s wealth, we can represent 
the evolution of wealth by: 
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B. The Model with the ‘Evade or Not’ Choice 
In this variation we allow agents in the economy to choose whether or not to evade 
taxes by comparing expected utilities from evading or not evading taxes.  If not 
evading taxes, agents born in t maximize 
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Here variables are analogously defined with ‘ne’ representing ‘not-evading’.  In this 
case the optimal consumption and bequest plans are given by 
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Proposition 1 below implicitly describes a critical level of wealth above which agents 
in the economy will decide to evade taxes on a proportion *α  of their income.2 
 
Proposition 1:  Given *α and W, an agent will evade iff 
                                                 
2   Note that *α is the optimal proportion of under-reported income if the person is ‘forced’ to evade. 
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Basically, agents in this economy will choose to evade if and only if the probability 
weighted geometric average of their disposable wealth in the states ‘caught’ and ‘not 
caught’ exceeds the disposable wealth when choosing not to evade.  For a proof of the 
above see the Appendix. 
 
C.  Political Economy Extensions 
Here we consider extensions of the models presented in Sections A and B above to 
include a political economy determination of one of the parameters of the tax system.  
Essentially, we assume that voting takes place at the beginning of the period and only 
young agents are allowed to vote on b or γ .  After the vote, in economy A agents 
make their evasion decision and state contingent plans, followed by the auditing by 
tax authorities, after which transfers are made and the state contingent plans are 
carried out.  In economy B, the only difference is that after the vote agents decide 
whether or not to evade, and if they choose to evade, they decide how much to evade.  
Subsequently, auditing takes place, transfers are made, and consumption, saving and 
bequest plans are carried out.  The timing of events of the political economy versions 
of the two economies is described in Figures 1 and 2 below. 
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Figure 1: Time line for the basic model 
 
 
Figure 2: Timeline for model with ‘evade or not’ choice. 
 
3. Results of Quantitative Experiments 
In what follows we first compare the outcomes in relation to the extent of evasion in 
the basic model and it’s variant with the evade or not choice.  For our experiments, we 
choose a ‘benchmark’ set of parameters given by the following: 
30;05.1;06.;1.0;2.0;1;35. ======= odrpb γφθ . 
      The benchmark distribution is lognormal with mean 3.2 and variance 0.8.  We 
consider a sample of 501 values from this distribution, with a Gini coefficient of 
.4073.  Figure 3 presents a comparison of the two models using the benchmark set of 
parameters.  The solid line represents the basic model.  As one can observe from the 
figure, all agents in this economy evade taxes, and the proportion of unreported 
income is a smooth monotonic function of agents’ wealth.  In the variant with the 
‘evade or not’ choice(represented by the dotted line), however, we can see that a large 
number of agents choose not to evade taxes.  In a sample of 501 agents only 145 of 
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the richest agents choose to evade.  The extent of evasion of the agents who choose to 
evade, is, of course virtually identical to that of the basic model. 
 
Figure 3: Extent of Evasion: Basic Model v/s ‘Evade or Not’ Variant 
To illustrate the differences further we consider some other experiments. Figure 4, 5, 
and 6 present experiments that vary the parameters od , p , and φ  respectively. In 
these figures, we only present the ‘evade or not’ variant for the sake of clearer 
graphical exposition – the basic model in all these cases involves evasion by all 
households in the economy, with α  appearing as a smooth monotonic function of 
wealth.  It is obvious from these experiments that the insightful and sensible aspects 
of the basic construct are preserved in the ‘evade or not’ variant – higher values of the 
enforcement and cost parameters curtail the extent of evasion. 
      However, the striking aspect of all these figures is that introducing an ‘evade or 
not’ decision into the standard Allingham and Sandmo construct has a significant 
impact in reducing the extent of evasion.  This is an important contribution in the 
sense that tax evasion models typically suggest a much higher degree of evasion than 
is observed in the data. 
      Essentially, within the framework of a heterogeneous agent economy, the 
assumption of an ‘evade or not’ choice is more appropriate.  ‘Forcing’ the poorer 
agents to evade when it is too costly is somewhat unrealistic. 
  
Figure 4: Experiments with cost function parameter od . 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Experiment with p, the probability of detection. 
 
Figure 6: Experiments with ‘penalty rate’. 
 
Experiments in relation to the parameters of progressivity, b  and γ , yield similar 
results. That is, progressivity appears to increase the extent of evasion in both 
economies, but the extent of evasion is always significantly lower in the ‘evade or 
not’ variant.3 
    Results in relation changing the initial distribution are a little less clear-cut, but for 
some ranges of inequality levels, we get the outcome that inequality typically 
encourages the extent of evasion. Figure 7 illustrates this result, which is consistent 
with empirical evidence, presented, for example, in Das-Gupta et. al. (1995).  Again, 
we can observe that the extent of evasion is significantly lower in the ‘evade or not’ 
model.  This feature suggests that voting outcomes in relation to the tax parameters 
could be very different.  This is indeed the case, as is illustrated in Tables 1 and 2. 
       
                                                 
3   We do not report the experiments here but they are available upon request 
 
Figure 7: Inequality and the Extent of Evasion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Vote on b or γ : Basic Model 
Gini Vote on b  % in favour Vote on γ  % in favour 
.2735 .95 85.43 1.1 88.82 
.3439 .95 96.21 1.1 97.00 
.3807 .95 94.41 1.1 95.80 
.4073 .95 90.62 1.1 92.61 
.4939 .95 94.81 1.1 97.40 
.5895 .95 98.60 1.1 99.60 
.5975 .95 99.20 1.1 99.60 
.6736 .95 99.40 1.1 99.60 
.6748 .95 98.20 1.1 99.00 
.8346 .95 99.20 1.1 99.20 
 
Table 2: Vote on b or γ : ‘Evade or Not’ Variant 
Gini Vote on b  % in favour Vote on γ  % in favour 
.2735 .05 100 1 100 
.3439 .15 100 1 100 
.3807 .15 96.00 1 100 
.4073 .15 94.61 1 100 
.4939 .15 81.63 1 100 
.5895 .15 71.65 1 100 
.5975 .15 76.64 1 100 
.6736 .095 95.01 1 100 
.6748 .15 55.28 1 100 
.8346 .95 48.70 1 100 
 
Table 1 illustrates the fact that the agents in the basic model desire a very progressive 
tax structure.  In the simulations, we allowed for a vote on a discrete set of values for 
b or γ .  Basically, in this model the agents prefer the most progressive value or b or 
γ  they are presented with.  In Table 2, on the other hand, we can see that the vote on 
b  leads to a choice of 0.15 in most cases.  In the case of γ , agents choose the least 
progressive value in the range presented to them. 
      These results appear reasonably intuitive.  In the ‘evade or not’ model, the 
efficiency of the tax-collection system does not matter; a large number of agents in 
the economy do not evade.  Agents therefore vote on a mildly progressive tax 
structure.  In the basic model agents vote for a progressive tax structure, even though 
progression appears to increase the extent of evasion; despite the increased extent of 
evasion redistributive transfers are greater in the latter case.  This result suggests 
strikingly different avenues of empirical research that have not been explored in the 
literature.  Specifically, empirical literature on tax evasion examines the issue of 
progressivity in terms of its impact on tax evasion rather than the other way around.  
While this may be reasonable in the sense that progressivity could impact on taxation 
due to a number of reasons, considered for example in Das-Gupta et. al (1995), such 
models may be mis-specified if the reverse causation is not taken into account. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
The basic Allingaham and Sandmo (1972) model of tax evasion approaches the issue 
by modelling the behavior of agents as a decision involving choice of the extent of 
their income to report to tax authorities, given a certain institutional environment 
represented by parameters such as the probability of detection and penalties in the 
event the agent is caught.  While this basic framework yields important insights on tax 
compliance behavior, it has some critical limitations, which have spawned a large 
body of literature. One particular limitation that has been the focus of much 
discussion is the model’s inability to predict a reasonable estimate of the extent of 
evasion in an economy; the model typically overestimates it relative to what is 
observed in the data.  This paper proposes a simple, and theoretically appropriate 
variation of the Allingham and Sandmo construct and integrates it to a dynamic 
equilibrium framework with heterogeneous agents.  We study an overlapping 
generations model in which agents must initially decide whether to evade taxes or not. 
In the event they decide to evade, they then have to decide the extent of income or 
wealth they wish to under-report.  We find that in comparison with the basic 
approach, the ‘evade or not’ choice drastically reduces the extent of evasion in the 
economy.  We also find that the basic model, and the model with and ‘evade or not’ 
choice have strikingly different political economy implications.    
 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1:  For a comparison of indirect utility functions in the two 
situations, it is first convenient to exploit the log utility form so that expected utility if 
you choose to evade is written as: 
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Likewise, if agents do not evade taxes, preferences may be written as: 
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We can simplify further by using the first order conditions and budget constraints to 
express all variables in terms of first period consumption.  In that case, (A1) can be 
written as )2)(1()2( )()ln( θθ +−+ pnct
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Substituting (11) and (12) into the former and (25) into the latter, we can then 
compare indirect utilities in the two situations.  We can then show that agents will 
choose to evade if and only if 
                                       .
2
ln
22
ln
1
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+≥⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
+
−
θθθ
dynedyncdyc pp  
In the above,  
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Given that the log transformation is monotonic, straightforward manipulation yields 
the result of proposition 1. 
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